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WHEN FEDERAL IMMIGRATION
EXCLUSION MEETS SUBFEDERAL
WORKPLACE INCLUSION: A FORENSIC
APPROACH TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Kati L. Griffith*
What happens when a person is simultaneously viewed as an unautho-
rized immigrant without rights according to a federal regime and as an
employee with rights according to a subfederal regime? In the wake of
widespread and inconsistent adjudication of this issue, this Article sheds
new light on this pressing question. To date, pertinent court battles and
scholarship have led to a virtual stalemate and often focus exclusively on
normative policy arguments. By contrast, this Article employs an empiri-
cally-grounded review of fifteen years of legislative history to analyze this
paradox. This review illustrates that the denial of workplace protections to
unauthorized workers runs contrary to immigration law purposes. The Arti-
cle, therefore, provides a fresh perspective on an otherwise intractable de-
bate. In doing so, it also develops a more scientifically grounded forensic
approach to legislative history which addresses some of the most salient
and passionate critiques of legislative history and revives legislative history
as a more reliable interpretive tool in law and policy analyses.
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INTRODUCTION
What happens when a person is simultaneously viewed as an un-
authorized immigrant without rights according to a federal statutory
regime, and as an employee with rights according to a set of state and
local (“subfederal”) workplace laws? By focusing on legalization pro-
grams, border enforcement strategies, employer verification require-
ments, and guest worker programs, debates about “comprehensive
immigration reform” all too often overlook this perplexing question.
Despite the inattention it receives in the policymaking arena, litigation
on this question abounds. In the last decade there has been widespread
and inconsistent adjudication of this issue in courts across the country.
Some courts have responded by providing full workplace rights for
employees regardless of immigration status. Others condition sub-
federal workplace protections on an employee’s immigration status.1
1. See infra Part I.C.
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Moreover, the answer to this question has significant conse-
quences. From a worker’s perspective, it could mean the difference
between payment and nonpayment for his or her work. Similarly, it
could significantly reduce the amount of monetary support that a
worker receives to address a serious workplace injury, even if the in-
jury makes future employment difficult or impossible. For policymak-
ers and courts, it has implications for the efficacy of both the
immigration-law and workplace-law regulatory regimes, as well as for
the constitutionally intended relationship between federal and state
governments. Because a potential conflict between federal immigra-
tion law and subfederal law is at issue, the question about the statute’s
purposes becomes a constitutional question that implicates the
Supremacy Clause.2
This Article is the first systematic review of fifteen years of legis-
lative history. As such, it sheds new light on the high-stakes and in-
tractable question of whether federal immigration law circumscribes
unauthorized workers’ subfederal workplace protections. These sub-
federal workplace protections include laws that address health and
safety at work, the payment of wages for work performed, and em-
ployment discrimination based on race, gender, and other protected
statuses. While some scholars have addressed this Supremacy Clause
question, they have not employed a comprehensive analysis of legisla-
tive history to gain analytical leverage.3 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme
2. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
3. See, e.g., Robert I. Correales, Workers’ Compensation and Vocational Rehabili-
tation Benefits for Undocumented Workers: Reconciling the Purported Conflicts Be-
tween State Law, Federal Immigration Law, and Equal Protection to Prevent the
Creation of a Disposable Workforce, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 347, 371–78 (2003)
(describing case law on the preemptive effect of federal immigration reform law);
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58
AM. U. L. REV. 1361, 1362 (2009) (analyzing the legal rights of unauthorized immi-
grants in context of employment law); Hugh Alexander Fuller, Immigration, Compen-
sation and Preemption: The Proper Measure of Lost Future Earning Capacity
Damages After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 985,
998–1006 (2006) (discussing the preemptive scope of federal immigration reform leg-
islation); Kati L. Griffith, Comment, A Supreme Stretch: The Supremacy Clause in the
Wake of IRCA and Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 127, 131–37
(2008) (examining the preemptive effect of federal immigration legislation on state
and local employment law); Michael H. LeRoy, Overruling Precedent: “A Derelict in
the Stream of the Law”, 66 SMU L. REV. 711, 748–50 (2013) (describing this para-
dox at play in worker compensation cases); Marı´a Pabo´n Lo´pez, The Place of the
Undocumented Worker in the United States Legal System After Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds: An Assessment and Comparison with Argentina’s Legal System, 15 IND.
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Court’s review of a related question about the relationship between
federal immigration law and federal labor law only considered “a sin-
gle Committee Report from one House of a politically divided Con-
gress,” which the justices in the majority dismissed and characterized
as “a rather slender reed” of legislative intent.4
This Article does more than bring needed insight to the pressing
question about whether federal immigration law conflicts with sub-
federal attempts to provide workplace protections to unauthorized im-
migrants. It also builds toward a more empirically-grounded and
reliable approach to the use of legislative history as an interpretive
tool in law and policy analysis. When statutory text is unclear, legisla-
tive history could be a potent analytical tool to help unravel statutory
meaning.5 The proposed approach responds to some of the most sali-
ent and passionate critiques of legislative history. Currently, one of the
most common critiques is what social scientists refer to as a tendency
toward “selective observation”: the tendency to “seek out evidence
that confirms what we already believe and ignore contradictory infor-
mation.”6 The often voluminous and heterogeneous reports, debates,
hearings, and presidential signing statements which make up the legis-
lative history of a statute can invite opportunistic “cherry-picking” of
only legislative materials that support one’s position.7 As is often
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 301, 303 (2005) (examining recent developments with respect
to the legal system’s attitude toward undocumented workers); Anne Marie
O’Donovan, Immigrant Workers and Workers’ Compensation After Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 299, 302 (2006)
(asserting that federal immigration law does not displace subfederal workers’ compen-
sation law); Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 497, 499–508 (2004) (outlining modern jurisprudence on em-
ployment law and undocumented immigrants).
4. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149–50 n.4 (2002);
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1980 (2011) (discussing H.R.
Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 (1986)).
5. See Michael F. Roessler, Mistaking Doubts and Qualms for Constitutional Law:
Against the Rejection of Legislative History as a Tool of Legal Interpretation, 39 SW.
L. REV. 103, 145–46 (2009) (arguing that when the text is ambiguous, interpreters of
statutes need to find sources beyond the text itself).
6. W. LAWRENCE NEUMAN, BASICS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH: QUALITATIVE AND
QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES 6 (3d ed. 2012).
7. It is common for scholars and courts to employ the “cherry-picking” critique of
the use of legislative history. See, e.g., Roessler, supra note 5, at 108 (“That school R
of thought that rejects legislative history as a proper tool of interpretation holds that
legislative history is simply unreliable and that inevitable cherry-picking occurs so
that the interpreter can find in the legislative history that meaning of the text before
her that she personally prefers as a matter of policy.”).
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stated, “consulting legislative history is like entering a crowded room
and looking around for one’s friends.”8
This Article’s proposed approach draws from insights and meth-
odology typically associated with social science as well as recent legal
scholarship to turn legislative history inquiries into systematic and
comprehensive assessments of opposing viewpoints.9 The Article re-
fers to the proposed approach as a “forensic approach” because, like
forensics, it promotes “the use of scientific knowledge or methods.”10
Rather than applying scientific methods to solve crimes, however, it
applies them to legislative history to help solve interpretive dilemmas
about the meaning of federal law.
In Part I, this Article explains the origins of the Supremacy
Clause question about federal immigration law’s impact on subfederal
workplace protections for unauthorized workers. It describes the rele-
vant statutory language in the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA)11 and the courts’ divided views on congressional intent in this
area. Part II draws from legal scholarship on empirical approaches to
legislative history as well as social science research methods to pro-
pose a forensic approach to legislative history. Part III then applies the
proposed approach to the question of whether, or to what extent, fed-
eral immigration law conflicts with subfederal workplace protections
for unauthorized immigrants. The Article concludes by placing the
analysis into the broader context of debates about immigration law’s
impact on subfederal workplace law and by proposing next steps in
the development of a forensic approach to legislative history.
8. Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence:
The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1874 (1998).
9. Scholars have identified the need to produce reliable approaches to the use of
legislative history. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Inter-
pretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE
L.J. 1750, 1840 (2010) (“Courts also might try to make legislative history use less
manipulable by articulating standards about what makes it reliable. The U.S. Supreme
Court’s stalemate over whether legislative history should be used at all has prevented
a more productive conversation from emerging about when legislative history is actu-
ally helpful.”) (emphasis omitted); Roessler, supra note 5, at 115 (“Analysis of legis- R
lative history’s reliability and value in a particular context always must be performed
in tandem with the use of other tools of interpretation, such as text, structure, and
precedent.”).
10. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (deluxe ed. 1998) (defining
“forensics”).
11. Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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I.
THE UNRESOLVED QUESTION: FEDERAL EXCLUSION
MEETS SUBFEDERAL INCLUSION
Why are courts asking whether subfederal workplace protections
for unauthorized workers conflict with federal immigration law?
There are essentially two reasons. First, the relevant immigration law
statute, IRCA,12 introduced mechanisms which enforce immigration
restrictions through the workplace but does not explicitly state
whether, or to what extent, Congress intended to affect subfederal
workplace law protections for unauthorized workers. Second, a 2002
U.S. Supreme Court case concluded that some federal labor law pro-
tections may conflict with IRCA’s purposes,13 which led some courts
to question whether subfederal workplace protections may conflict as
well. Part I will describe each of these reasons. It will then detail how
courts have varied their responses to this question in cases involving
the subfederal workplace protections of unauthorized employees.
A. Ambiguous Statutory Language
IRCA’s text is somewhat ambiguous about the intended relation-
ship between federal immigration regulation in the workplace and sub-
federal workplace protections. IRCA’s express preemption provision
does not lend guidance to this analysis. According to the provision,
IRCA “preempt[s] any State or local law imposing civil or criminal
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those
who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized
aliens.”14 This provision clarifies that IRCA preempts subfederal at-
tempts to sanction employers for employing the unauthorized (except
through licensing and similar laws)15 but does not directly address
whether IRCA preempts subfederal attempts to protect unauthorized
12. Id.
13. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 137–53 (2002).
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2013).
15. There has been a lot of debate about how broadly to read this provision when
states pass laws intending to restrict immigration. Compare Chamber of Commerce v.
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1981 (2011) (concluding that federal law did not expressly
or impliedly preempt local licensing law), with Chamber of Commerce v. Edmond-
son, 594 F.3d 742, 765–66 (10th Cir. 2010) (concluding that federal law preempted
local law). See generally Kevin R. Johnson, It’s the Economy, Stupid: The Hijacking
of the Debate over Immigration Reform by Monsters, Ghosts, and Goblins (or the War
on Drugs, War on Terror, Narcoterrorists, Etc.), 13 CHAP. L. REV. 583, 605–08
(2010) (discussing the tension between federal revenue and state costs resultant from
alien workers).
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workers who experience violations of their subfederal workplace
rights.16
There is some disagreement about what IRCA’s remaining provi-
sions tell us about congressional purposes with respect to unauthorized
workers’ workplace protections. IRCA’s workplace-based immigra-
tion-enforcement scheme led some to argue that Congress intended to
circumscribe the workplace protections of unauthorized workers.17
IRCA, unlike its immigration law predecessors, “forcefully” brought
immigration enforcement into the workplace.18 The rationale behind
this legislative strategy was simple. Because many unauthorized im-
migrants come to the United States to find employment, the legislation
aimed to make those jobs more difficult to obtain.19 IRCA tries to curb
unauthorized immigration via the workplace through (1) requiring that
employers verify the immigration status of all of their employees;20
(2) sanctioning employers who knowingly employ unauthorized immi-
grants;21 and (3) sanctioning employees who use fraudulent docu-
ments to gain employment.22 Given these provisions, some have
claimed that curtailing workplace protections for unauthorized work-
ers is in line with congressional intent because it further reduces unau-
thorized immigrants’ incentives to pursue jobs in the United States.23
On the other hand, some have highlighted IRCA’s protections of
workplace rights to argue that Congress intended to bolster workplace
protections for unauthorized workers. For example, they cite IRCA’s
section 111(d), which states:
There are authorized to be appropriated . . . such sums as may be
necessary to the Department of Labor for enforcement activities of
the Wage and Hour Division . . . in order to deter the employment
16. See § 1324a(h)(2).
17. See infra Part I.C.
18. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 147; see also Arizona v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2504 (2012) (describing how “Congress enacted IRCA as a
comprehensive framework” for deterring the employment of unauthorized individuals
(citing Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147)).
19. Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 231 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“Employment is the magnet that attracts aliens here illegally . . . . Employers will be
deterred by the penalties in this legislation from hiring unauthorized aliens and this, in
turn, will deter aliens from entering illegally or violating their status in search of
employment.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)–(b) (2013).
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2013).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a) (2013).
23. See infra Part I.C.
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of unauthorized aliens and remove the economic incentive for em-
ployers to exploit and use such aliens.24
Thus, along with the employer verification requirements and
sanctions listed above, Congress included monetary support for fed-
eral wage and hour enforcement on behalf of the unauthorized in the
legislation. Given this provision, some have claimed that Congress in-
tended to bolster workplace protections for unauthorized workers at
the federal and subfederal levels as a way to reduce employer incen-
tives to employ unauthorized workers.25
B. A Supreme Court Case Fuels the Fires of Statutory Ambiguity
A 2002 U.S. Supreme Court decision, which addressed the rela-
tionship between federal immigration law and federal labor law, exac-
erbated the ambiguity about IRCA’s purposes. In Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, the Court asked whether IRCA foreclosed
a back pay remedy to an unauthorized employee who had suffered a
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) violation due to his involve-
ment in labor union organizing activities.26 The Court did not question
whether the unauthorized worker had NLRA rights to engage in con-
certed activity to improve the workplace.27 The Court reasoned, how-
ever, that the provision of a federal labor law back pay remedy to an
unauthorized employee to address the employer’s NLRA violation
“would encourage the successful evasion of apprehension by immigra-
tion authorities, condone prior violations of immigration laws, and en-
courage future violations.”28
Because the Court concluded that IRCA did indeed foreclose this
federal labor law remedy, IRCA’s effects on the workplace protec-
tions available under federal and state workplace laws outside of the
NLRA context became even more unclear.29
24. Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
§ 111(d), 100 Stat. 3359, 3381 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2013)).
25. See e.g., Kati L. Griffith, Discovering “Immployment” Law: The Constitution-
ality of Subfederal Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389,
442–44 (2010–2011).
26. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140–42 (2002).
27. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149–50 n.4.
28. Id. at 151.
29. See Jayesh M. Rathod, Beyond the “Chilling Effect”: Immigrant Worker Be-
havior and the Regulation of Occupational Safety & Health, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 267, 271–74 (2010) (reporting on the “cascade of litigation” after Hoffman).
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C. Diverging Case Law
A review of post-Hoffman cases that addressed the question of
IRCA’s influence on subfederal workplace protections demonstrates
extensive inconsistency. Courts vary widely in their conclusions as
well as their rationales for reaching those conclusions. A review of
over 200 cases reported on LexisNexis that cited Hoffman in the con-
text of a subfederal workplace law claim yielded thirty-seven cases
that directly answered this question.30
The holdings of these cases are split fairly evenly. In sixteen
cases, judges modified the subfederal workplace protections available
to unauthorized workers in order to avoid a potential conflict with
IRCA (hereinafter referred to as the “IRCA conflict” cases or
courts).31 The extent of modification varied widely. In some cases, for
instance, IRCA conflict courts categorically excluded unauthorized
immigrants from the lost future earnings remedy or back pay.32 In
others, they only excluded unauthorized immigrants who violated
IRCA by procuring fraudulent documents to gain employment or con-
ditioned the amount of future earnings on the wages of the worker’s
home country.
30. A LexisNexis search of all federal and state cases that cited Hoffman from
March 21, 2002, the date of the Hoffman decision, until May 31, 2013, yielded 217
cases to review. All cases were reviewed. Cases qualified for inclusion if they cited
Hoffman, involved a worker’s subfederal statutory or tort claim against an employer,
and made a conclusion about whether immigration status conditions an employee’s
claim or remedies in any way.
31. See Romero v. Reiman Corp., No. 11-Civ-216-F, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
157839, at *16–20 (D. Wyo. Dec. 21, 2011); Ulin v. ALAEA-72, No. C-09-3160-
EDL, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17468, at *24–28 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2011); Zuniga v.
Morris Material Handling, Inc., No. 10-C-696, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14352, at *4–20
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2011); Hocza v. City of New York, No. 06-3340, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3574, at *8-11  (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2009); Ambrosi v. 1085 Park Ave. LLC,
No. 06-CV-8163 (BSJ), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73930, at *34–45 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25,
2008); Morejon v. Terry Hinge & Hardware, No. B162878, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 10394, at *27–31 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2003); Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy Inc.,
658 N.W.2d 510, 512, 520–21 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003); Rosa v. Partners in Progress,
Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 1000 (N.H. 2005); Crespo v. Evergo Corp., 841 A.2d 471,
473–74, 477 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); Gonzalez v. Performance Painting,
Inc., 303 P.3d 802, 807–08 (N.M. 2013); Matter of Ramroop v. Flexo-Craft Printing,
Inc., 896 N.E.2d 69, 71–73 (N.Y. 2008); Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d
1246, 1251–60 (N.Y. 2006); Coque v. Wildflower Estates Developers, Inc., 867
N.Y.S.2d 158, 160, 162–66 (App. Div. 2008); Cherokee Industries, Inc. v. Alvarez,
84 P.3d 798, 799–801 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003); Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers’
Comp. Appeal Bd., 810 A.2d 99, 104–105, 108–109 (majority opinion), 110–12
(Neuman, J., dissenting) (Pa. 2002); Xinic v. Quick, No. 2004-226030, 2005 WL
3789231, at *1–2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005).
32. See, e.g., Crespo, 841 A.2d at 473–74, 477.
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In twenty-one cases, judges did not view a potential conflict be-
tween workplace protections and IRCA and refused to modify the sub-
federal protections available to unauthorized workers in any way.33
The judges in such cases viewed the provision of subfederal work-
place protections to unauthorized workers as consistent with IRCA’s
purpose to reduce unauthorized immigration (hereinafter referred to as
the “IRCA harmony” cases or courts).
This Article gains analytical leverage on this intractable question
through the development of a forensic approach to legislative history34
and the application of that approach to fifteen years of IRCA’s legisla-
tive history.35 It focuses on subfederal workplace protections, which
fall within the police powers of subfederal governments, because hon-
ing in on Congress’ purposes through an empirically rigorous ap-
proach is especially crucial in these cases. As a matter of Supremacy
Clause jurisprudence, federal immigration law can only preempt these
assertions of state police power if it was Congress’ “manifest purpose”
to foreclose or circumscribe subfederal governments in this way.36
Because there is no applicable express preemption provision,
courts must engage in implied conflict preemption analyses. Specifi-
cally, the Supremacy Clause question in these cases is whether sub-
federal workplace protections for unauthorized workers “stand[ ] as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
33. See Bordejo v. Exclusive Builders, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 2d 617, 624–25 (M.D. Pa.
Aug. 22, 2011); Flores v. Limehouse, No. 2:04-1295-CWH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30433, at *6–7 (D.S.C. May 11, 2006); Reyes v. Van Elk, Ltd., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 68,
76 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1222 (2008); Farmers Bros. Coffee v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 23, 28 (Ct. App. 2005); Del. Valley
Field Servs. v. Ramirez, No. 12A-01-007-JOH, 2012 Del. Super. LEXIS 622, at *30
(Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 2012); Asylum Co. v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 10 A.3d
619, 628 (D.C. 2010); Safeharbor Emp’r Services I, Inc. v. Velazquez, 860 So.2d 984,
985–86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Cont’l PET Techs., Inc. v. Palacias, 604 S.E.2d
627, 629–30 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); Econ. Packing Co. v. Illinois Workers’ Comp.
Comm’n, 901 N.E.2d 915, 926 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); Staff Mgmt. v. Jimenez, 839
N.W.2d 640, 652–53 (Iowa 2013); Coma Corp. v. Kansas Dep’t of Labor, 154 P.3d
1080, 1091–94 (Kan. 2007); Abel Verdon Const. v. Rivera, 348 S.W.3d 749, 754–56
(Ky. 2011); Rodriguez v. Integrity Contracting, 38 So. 3d 511, 519–20 (La. Ct. App.
2010); Design Kitchen & Baths v. Lagos, 882 A.2d 817, 824–30 (Md. 2005); Pontes
v. New Eng. Power Co., No. 03-00160A, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 340, at *5–9
(Mass. Super. Ct. 2004); Correa v. Waymouth Farms, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 324, 325, 331
n.4 (Minn. 2003); Amoah v. Mallah Mgmt., LLC, 866 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (App. Div.
2008); Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 56, 62 (App. Div.
2005); Garcia v. Pasquareto, 812 N.Y.S.2d 216, 217–18 (App. Div. 2004); Pineda v.
Kel-Tech Const., Inc., 832 N.Y.S.2d 386, 392 (Sup. Ct. 2007); Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
Guzman, 116 S.W.3d 233, 244 (Tex. App. 2003).
34. See infra Part II.
35. See infra Part III.
36. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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objectives of Congress.”37 A focus on the federal immigration law’s
effects on subfederal law, rather than the relationship between federal
immigration law and federal workplace laws, also moves us away
from the well-tread scholarly endeavor of “beat[ing] the Hoffman
Plastics decision like some pin˜ata . . . .”38
II.
TOWARD A FORENSIC APPROACH TO
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Judges and scholars are increasingly locking horns over whether
it is a futile endeavor to turn to legislative history to help us under-
stand congressional purposes behind a piece of legislation.39 Thus,
before turning to the specific elements of the proposed forensic ap-
proach to legislative history, the Article first addresses the threshold
question of whether the documents forming legislative history can
ever be reliable sources to consult in law and policy interpretation.
A. Why Is a Forensic Approach to Legislative History Necessary?
Despite calls to abandon legislative history, developing a forensic
approach to legislative history is worthwhile because (1) divining the
“true intents” of legislators is not necessary in order to attribute stated
purposes to a piece of legislation40 and (2) courts inevitably will
37. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
38. Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The Borders of Collective Representation:
Comparing the Rights of Undocumented Workers to Organize Under United States
and International Labor Standards, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 431, 432 (2009). For other
articles on Hoffman that do not significantly focus on subfederal issues, see, for exam-
ple, Robert I. Correales, Did Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. Produce Disposable
Workers?, 14 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 103 (2003); Angel A. Darmer, Reconciling
IRCA with the Anti-Retaliation Provisions of the NLRA: How Far Should Hoffman
Plastic Compounds Be Extended?, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 687 (2011); Ruben J.
Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Dichotomies of
Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH.  J.L. REFORM 737 (2003); Chris-
topher Ho & Jennifer C. Chang, Drawing the Line After Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc. v. NLRB: Strategies for Protecting Undocumented Workers in the Title VII Con-
text and Beyond, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 473 (2004–2005); David L. Hudson
Jr., Tales of Hoffman: A 2002 High Court Case Figures Prominently in Immigrant
Rights Battle, 92 A.B.A. J. 12 (2006).
39. Compare Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 108, 122
(2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting), with City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S.
113, 127 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). See also Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimat-
ing Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2061–73 (2002) (summariz-
ing the criticisms of legislative history).
40. See generally Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpret-
ing Statutes, 65 S. CALIF. L. REV. 845, 864 (1992) (“Conceptually, however, one can
ascribe an ‘intent’ to Congress in enacting the words of a statute if one means ‘intent’
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continue to turn to legislative history in their legal analyses (and will
continue to experience the pitfalls) even if futility arguments have
merit as a theoretical matter.
Many arguments against legislative history are based on the ob-
servation that there is no such thing as legislative intent, and that
therefore reviewing legislative history is a fool’s errand. In this vein,
Judge Easterbrook has said that “intent is elusive for a natural person,
fictive for a collective body.”41 Along these same lines, scholars have
highlighted that Congress is a complex body of hundreds of people
that simply cannot share one intent about the meaning of statutory
language.42 In 1930, Max Radin wrote a still-influential article on this
topic. He stated:
in its, here relevant, sense of ‘purpose,’ rather than its sense of ‘motive.’”); Roessler,
supra note 5, at 111–12 (noting that it is not useful to consider the “individual legisla- R
tors’ subjective intent”).
41. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994); see also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Defer-
ence to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (arguing that
“the quest for the ‘genuine’ legislative intent is probably a wild-goose chase any-
way”). Both are cited in John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from
Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV 70, 74 n.12 (2006). Moreover, some have critiqued
legislative history as futile because it is an unconstitutional delegation of power to a
subgroup of legislators. See John F. Manning, Textualism as Nondelegation Doc-
trine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 676 (1997) (“By using legislative history as an authori-
tative source of legislative intent, the Court makes legislative self-delegation possible;
Congress’s own agents can go far in determining the details of statutory meaning
simply by declaring their own conception of legislative intent. This practice is in sig-
nificant tension with the Supreme Court’s modern separation-of-powers case law,
which establishes that legislative self-delegation poses a particularly acute danger to
bicameralism and presentment and is unconstitutional per se.”); see also Morris P.
Fiorina, Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative
Power, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33, 49 n.22 (1986) (observing that committee reports are
“prepared by the unrepresentative members and their staffs”).
42. For these scholars, “a search for legislative intent is futile” and it is dubious that
“hundreds of legislators . . .  share a coherent ‘intent’ on a matter not clearly resolved
by the statute for which they voted.” Manning, supra note 41, at 684–85 (citing Max R
Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930)); see also Abbe R.
Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Con-
sensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1762–63 (2010)
(“[T]extualists take a ‘realist’ view of Congress, which translates to their rejection of
the notion that a multimember legislative body can have a single, discernable ‘in-
tent’”); Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence:
The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1833–34 (1998)
(“Legislative intent is a meaningless concept, because intentions cannot coherently be
attributed to collective bodies. Even if the concept of legislative intent were coherent,
legislative history is unreliable evidence of that intent.”) (footnote omitted). But see
Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History
by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 82 (2012) (“Even if one does not accept the recent
philosophical work supporting group agency, one should at least accept that, however
fictional, the concept of group agency exists in the law.”).
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The chances that of several hundred [legislators] each will have
exactly the same determinate situations in mind as possible reduc-
tions of a given determinable, are infinitesimally small. The chance
is still smaller that a given determinate, the litigated issue, will not
only be within the minds of all these [legislators], but will be cer-
tain to be selected by all of them as the present limit to which the
determinable should be narrowed.43
Similarly, some scholars and judges argue that using legislative
history is futile because we cannot infer “intent” from legislators’ ac-
quiescence to specific language in a statute.44 They point out that there
are many reasons why legislators may acquiesce to a bill. For instance,
some “legislative outcomes” occur because of “seemingly arbitrary (or
at least non substantive) factors, such as the sequence of alternatives
presented (agenda manipulation) and the practice of strategic voting
(logrolling).”45 Public choice theorists often view a legislator’s acqui-
escence to statutory language as an indicator of the power of interest
groups and the “bargains struck among those groups.”46 In this way,
public choice theorists see “actual statutory language” as “the dearest
legislative commodity” rather than an indicator of legislators’ intents
about how to interpret specific language in a statute.47
43. Radin, supra note 42, cited in Manning, supra note 41, at 684 n.46; see also R
Nourse, supra note 42, at 80 (describing Professor Radin’s view that there is “no such R
thing as ‘legislative intent’” is a “classic ‘realist’ claim”).
44. Along the same lines as the “futility argument,” it is difficult to divine the intent
of legislators when they vote for a bill because many legislators are not aware of
much of what is said about a piece of legislation before they vote for it. As Professor
Manning has stated, “courts simply do not know whether most legislators (much less
presidents) have read, or are even aware of, the pre-enactment interpretations con-
tained in the legislative history.” Manning, supra note 41, at 686. Consequently, ac- R
cording to this rationale, it is an analytical stretch to conclude that legislative history
can tell us something about what a party intended when he or she voted for or signed a
bill.
45. Manning, supra note 41, at 685 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 686 (“If R
legislative outcomes turn on procedural maneuvers and strategic behavior, judges can-
not reconstruct what a legislature would have ‘intended’ to achieve if it had explicitly
settled a point that was not clearly resolved in the statutory text (the only text that a
requisite majority of legislators voted to enact).”).
46. Id. at 687; see also Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More
Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 42 (1991) (“Committee membership
rarely represents a cross-section of the legislature. Instead, legislators tend to self-
select into those committees in which their supporters have the greatest stakes.”).
47. Manning, supra note 41, at 687–88; see also Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. R
Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1442–43
(2003) (“Legislative communication is, in part, an exercise in spin control. . . . Be-
cause legislators know that courts often turn to legislative indicia to resolve ambigui-
ties in the legislation, legislators have an incentive to influence—and even
manipulate—the record to serve their ends rather than those of others. Legislators’
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These futility arguments about the use of legislative history pro-
vide helpful insight into how to frame legislative history inquiries but
should not compel us to abandon the practice all together. They illu-
minate why it is imperative to move away from inquiries into the
thought processes and true motivations of legislators when we are try-
ing to interpret statutory meaning within the parameters of the U.S.
legal system. Without intending to do so, judges and scholars who
engage in futility arguments direct us to frame inquiries into legisla-
tive history as searching for purposes that are attached to the legisla-
tion and are not evident from the statutory text itself.  As Justice
Breyer has stated, the “personal motives” of legislators “do not change
the purpose of the bill’s language.”48 Even if an individual legislator
votes for a bill because he or she is beholden to a powerful interest
group and solely intends to please that group, the bill nonetheless car-
ries with it legislative purposes that must be interpreted and carried
forth within our legal system.
While this analytical shift to stated purposes may still have some
drawbacks,49 we still need to develop a forensic approach to legisla-
tive history because the use of legislative history—as well as inquiry
propensities to manipulate and manufacture legislative histories confound efforts to
recover accurate indicia of legislative intent.”) (footnotes omitted).  For judicial criti-
ques along these lines, see, for example, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc.,
545 U.S. 546, 568, 570 (2005) (suggesting that some legislative language is the prod-
uct of manipulative legislators, staffers, and lobbyists). But see James J. Brudney,
Below the Surface: Comparing Legislative History Usage by the House of Lords and
the Supreme Court, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 53 (2007) (“There are constraints, how-
ever, on legislative actors behaving in such a manner—notably, certain incentives
within the legislative process that operate to encourage accuracy and probity, espe-
cially by committee leaders (who tend to function as bill managers) and their staffs. In
the short-term, members know they must rely on colleagues’ representations at the
committee stage as to what a bill means, because Congress operates heavily through
its committees and members depend upon the accuracy of committee-based informa-
tion in moving the legislative agenda. More generally, members as repeat players in
the legislative process typically aspire in the long-term to a positive relationship with
their colleagues and wi th the institution.” (footnote omitted)).
48. Breyer, supra note 40, at 865–66. However, legislative history is still a “tool” R
that courts can use “as part of their overarching interpretive task of producing a coher-
ent and relatively consistent body of statutory law, even were the ‘rational member of
Congress’ a pure fiction, made up out of whole cloth.” Id. at 867.
49. Nourse, supra note 42, at 134–52; Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 47, at R
1432–33 (“The basic democratic principle of majority rule, established in Article I of
the U.S. Constitution, ensures that legislators must create a coalition at least as large
as a majority of the legislators in each house in order to enact legislation. The process
of legislation, then, is shaped by the decisions made by legislators to form and main-
tain coalitions within the institutional structure of the legislature and within the struc-
ture of those nonlegislative institutions (the presidency, the judiciary, and the
bureaucracy) upon which legislators rely to facilitate their legislative aims.”) (foot-
notes omitted).
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into what it can contribute to legal analyses—continues, despite these
judicial and scholarly calls for its abandonment. As Professor Victoria
Nourse’s influential recent work on legislative history contends, we
need to push for empirical rigor in this area because “[l]egislative his-
tory’s fires still burn, despite repeated attempts to extinguish them. . . .
[T]he question is how [legislative history] is best used.”50 This Arti-
cle, and its proposed forensic approach to legislative history, takes a
significant step in this direction. A more empirically-grounded ap-
proach to the study of legislative history can ameliorate many of the
concerns raised by the critics of legislative history. At the very least,
the introduction of a new source of authority may alter the terms of a
sometimes intractable debate and provide additional context to help
interpret ambiguous statutory language.
B. What Are the Elements of the Proposed Forensic Approach
to Legislative History?
As an initial matter, interpreters should make sure there is a true
ambiguity which statutory language cannot resolve on its own. Some
critics claim that judges and scholars turn too quickly to legislative
history when they should just rely on the statutory text.51 The pro-
posed forensic approach to legislative history fully acknowledges that
the legislation’s text, case law precedent, and canons of construction
are the primary means to interpret statutory text. Nonetheless, when
there is a true ambiguity, legislative history can provide additional
context. As Hart and Sacks have said, legislative history is helpful
when the other tools “leave[ ] you in doubt about the choice between”
two interpretations.52 Thus, interpreters should turn to a review of the
legislative history in order to “understand the context and purpose of a
statute” when there are two reasonable views of the statute’s meaning
that the plain language of the statute cannot resolve on its own.53 It is
in such a circumstance that social scientists might call for a more sys-
50. Nourse, supra note 42, at 72. Justice Breyer has stated that criticisms of legisla- R
tive history “call, not for abandonment of the practice, but at most for its careful use.”
Breyer, supra note 40, at 847. R
51. See James J. Brudney, Confirmatory Legislative History, 76 BROOK. L. REV.
901, 901–02 (2011) (discussing Justice Scalia’s criticism of the use of legislative his-
tory to bolster a textualist resolution of statutory meaning as “wasteful research”).
52. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1232 (William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
53. Breyer, supra note 40, at 848. R
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tematic empirical approach—or a forensic approach—to legislative
history.54
The forensic approach to legislative history draws from social
scientific insights and legal scholarship to propose a way to discipline
and standardize reviews of the legislative record. As described above,
one of the central critiques of how legislative history has been used is
that judges and scholars just “pick and choose” from the legislative
history because there is no uniform approach to legislative history.55
The proposed approach ensures a “warts-and-all” view of legislative
history that enables courts, scholars, advocates, and commentators
(collectively referred to here as “interpreters”) to weigh the relative
strength of various interpretations of statutory meaning.
To be able to assess with more empirical vigor the degree to
which the legislative history supports one interpretation of the statu-
tory language more than another, interpreters should take a number of
steps that follow basic social scientific principles. Such an approach
entails specifying opposing views and constructing a coding scheme
that guides interpreters to define and systematically review the sample
of relevant legislative history materials that are associated with a
given piece of legislation.56 Specifically, as the Article will describe in
detail below, the proposed approach encourages interpreters to: (1)
specify opposing “hypotheses” (interpretations) which includes identi-
fying key variables of interest; (2) account for hierarchies of authority;
and (3) systematically review the entire body of relevant legislative
history to “test” opposing hypotheses.
1. Specifying Opposing Hypotheses
Interpreters should specify the opposing interpretations as much
as possible and derive hypotheses from these competing interpreta-
tions. The interpreter must then specify the parameters for statements
that would constitute evidence in support of one interpretation of leg-
islative history versus those that would constitute evidence in support
of another. The process of specification into measurable factors is
analogous to social scientific processes of operationalizing variables.57
54. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AMERICAN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 154–55 (2002) (discussing the systematic organization
of the book around “basic questions about legislative history and statutory
interpretation”).
55. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, This Lemon Comes as a Lemon: The Lemon Test and
the Pursuit of a Statute’s Secular Purpose, 20 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 351, 371–72
(2010).
56. See NEUMAN, supra note 6, at 95–100, 115–32, 147–51, 239–45. R
57. See generally id. at 115–32, 241–49.
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Having done so, the interpreter can then identify the specific types of
content within the entire legislative record that should be considered
in adjudicating between contending interpretations. This also enables
the interpreter to establish the universe of specific content to be cate-
gorized according to different viewpoints. This step helps to amelio-
rate the tendency for interpreters to overlook aspects of the legislative
history that support the opposing viewpoint. It also helps to define the
universe of relevant legislative history materials (the sample).
2. Accounting for Hierarchies of Authority
When constructing a coding scheme that guides a review of legis-
lative history and identifies which legislative history sources are most
useful, interpreters should also be attuned to potential hierarchies. Any
coding scheme must acknowledge that “not all legislative history is
created equal.”58 Some critics of legislative history argue that many
judges, scholars, and critics do not respect the hierarchy of authority
among various legislative history materials.59 In other words, they
look at all elements of legislative history equally and do not acknowl-
edge that some time frames, some documents, and some speakers may
have more interpretive weight than others.60 Because they are prima-
rily driven by the motive to find what helps their view, and to over-
look counter views, they select what they like and ignore the rest.61
Moreover, as Professor Nourse has demonstrated, sometimes inter-
preters misuse the materials simply because they do not understand
congressional rules or “how legislation is actually created.”62 Thus,
the coding scheme should allow interpreters to view the material from
a variety of viewpoints. Specifically, it should allow interpreters (if
they so desire) to consider the timing, the type of legislative history
document, and the identity of the speaker associated with each rele-
vant statement.
58. Cheryl Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from Positive
Theories of Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957, 973 (2007)
(“[S]ome aspects of legislative history are trustworthy indicia of legislative meaning
and others are not. Thus, the task for judges is to determine which aspects of legisla-
tive history are trustworthy and to rely only upon those sources when decoding statu-
tory meaning.”).
59. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 42, at 73. R
60. See id. at 74–75.
61. See Roessler, supra note 5, at 108. R
62. Nourse, supra note 42, at 75. R
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a. Timing
By dating all of the codes, interpreters will be able to separate out
the more recent materials from the older materials. The recent materi-
als may be more relevant to some analyses if they relate more closely
to the final wording of the bill.63 It is important, for instance, to know
when the interpreter is coding material in an earlier committee report
that is referring solely to text that was later altered or omitted.64 None-
theless, sometimes earlier legislative materials can be more relevant
than later ones.65 Professor Nourse’s empirical approach to legislative
history helpfully directs the inquiry toward “the last relevant deci-
sion.”66 For Professor Nourse, “[t]he best legislative history is the last,
most specific decision related to the interpretive question prior to the
textual decision.”67 In other cases, earlier materials may be relevant
when the question does not relate to a precise “textual decision” to
alter language but instead has to do with the broader context or under-
lying policies of the legislation.68 This longer historical view will al-
low interpreters to see, among other things, what kinds of sentiments
and policy threads are consistent across time, despite variations in the
bill’s wording.
b. Type of Document
Along with the timing, interpreters should code the type of legis-
lative history document that is reviewed (report, debate, hearing). Re-
ports69 and debates70 are widely viewed as more authoritative than
63. Id. at 73 (arguing that earlier reports will be less reliable than later reports when
the latter is discussing a “much-altered” piece of legislation).
64. Early legislative history can be seen as less reliable because it “does not reflect
many of the deals agreed upon to ensure passage of the bill.” Blackman, supra note
55, at 370. R
65. Id. (“Other legislative history may also be unreliable because it was created
later in the process according to a specific agenda and lacks much of the record de-
vised while the bill was actually being deliberated.”); see also Nourse, supra note 42, R
at 110 (“[T]here may be cases where the most specific legislative history on the issue
appears earlier rather than later in the process, as, for example, when a committee
report speaks directly to the question being litigated.”).
66. Nourse, supra note 42, at 76. R
67. Nourse, supra note 42, at 110; see also id. at 101 (“The important point is that a R
one-and-a-half page segment of the conference report’s joint explanation is the rele-
vant legislative history. One need not wade knee-deep in the thirteen-year history of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.”) (footnotes omitted).
68. Id. at 90 (“[This theory] does not . . . look to legislative history to find vague
purposes, but looks for Congress’s textual decisions in the actual rule-based history of
the statute.”).
69. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 47, at 40–42 (arguing that the Supreme Court R
relies on committee reports because the reports “shed[ ] light on the meaning or impli-
cations of inclusive text[,]” “reflect [the] level of consideration” of committee mem-
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hearings. Committee reports, for instance, are widely acknowledged as
“an authoritative context for choosing among alternative meanings of
the text”71 and as the views of an influential group of “advocates for
the bill.”72 Hearings may be relevant in certain circumstances, but
generally carry less interpretive weight when compared to reports and
debates.73
Professor Nourse and others have questioned this hierarchy of
authority, arguing, according to the rationale mentioned above, that
the most relevant documents are the ones that most specifically ad-
dress the issue at hand.74 If something is covered specifically in the
hearings, but not in reports or debates, the hearings may become the
most relevant source in the legislative history. The coding scheme will
allow each interpreter to decide how much weight to accord to the
document type.
bers, and are “highly accessible due to a format that is orderly and understandable to
other members, to the courts, and to the broader legal community[,]” and committee
members develop a level of expertise over subject areas within their “ongoing juris-
dictional ambit.”); George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other “Benign
Fictions”: The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other
Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 43 (explaining that committee
reports are well regarded because “they represent the considered and collective under-
standing of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legisla-
tion.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); William D. Popkin, Symposium on
Statutory Interpretation: Foreword: Nonjudicial Statutory Interpretation, 66 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 301, 317 (1990) (“Committee reports are therefore properly treated as
the most reliable type of legislative history.” (footnote omitted)). Some, however, ar-
gue that reliance on reports is “undemocratic.” See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Al-
lapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005); Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149–50 (2002); Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct.
1968, 1980 (2011); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008); Wyeth v.
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1206–07 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring); Mod-Con Freight
Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Comm’n, 545 U.S. 440, 468 (2005) (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting).
70. See, e.g., Costello, supra note 69, at 70–71 (1990) (discussing when debates are R
useful to clarify the statute or to get background information).
71. William Eskridge, Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365,
374–75 (1990); see also Richard A. Danner, Justice Jackson’s Lament: Historical and
Comparative Perspectives on the Availability of Legislative History, 13 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 151, 164 (2003) (reasoning that committee reports are generally
considered more reliable than floor debates because they involve less “politicking”).
72. Jeffrey L. Roether, Note, Interpreting Congressional Silence: CAFA’s Jurisdic-
tional Burden of Proof in Post-Removal Remand Proceedings, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
2745, 2767–68 (2007).
73. Blackman, supra note 55, at 370 (“[L]egislative history may not be reliable R
because it reflects the views of outsiders to the bill who provided the public state-
ments that give the bill a gloss favorable to their point of view, regardless of whether
anyone else agrees with it.”).
74. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 42, at 110. R
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c. Speaker
A third layer of coding should include the identity of the speaker
for each statement.  This can help interpreters who believe that the
speaker’s level of involvement in the drafting of the bill affects the
statement’s interpretative value. There is some disagreement on this
issue as well. The most common view is that statements by bill spon-
sors, bill drafters, floor managers, and the chair of the subcommittee
are more persuasive than statements by other legislators.75 According
to this view, “[s]tatements by Members not associated with sponsor-
ship or committee consideration of a bill are accorded little weight.”76
For some, the identity of the speaker is most relevant when there were
no hearings on a bill or language was added to the legislation on the
House or Senate floor.77 In these situations, the committee reports do
not address the question at hand.
By contrast, however, the public choice critiques referenced
above78 suggest that the views of the median legislator are more per-
suasive because they are less likely to be acting on behalf of powerful
interest groups.79 Moreover, some argue that “statements of those who
lost the debate” are not “authoritative statements of meaning.”80 This
is especially important when the vote turned on the specifics of the
disputed text. The coding scheme will allow interpreters to tease out
these differences and see whether there are differences based on the
weight of authority. They can run reports, for example, that group the
output based on the speaker’s level of involvement.
d. Employing Comprehensive and Systematic Analyses
Once the coding scheme is complete, interpreters should employ
a comprehensive and systematic review of the relevant legislative his-
tory. This will avoid purely inductive or opportunistic inquiries. In
other words, a forensic approach to legislative history moves the in-
quiry away from what some have referred to as “inevitable cherry-
75. See, e.g., Costello, supra note 69, at 41; Danner, supra note 71, at 164. R
76. Costello, supra note 69, at 41–42. R
77. See id. at 50 (stating that when floor statements address issues not considered
by committee reports, “views of Members closely associated with the legislation
through either sponsorship or committee review can be helpful”); Lori L. Outzs, A
Principled Use of Congressional Floor Speeches in Statutory Interpretation, 28
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 297, 317–18 (1995).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 45–47. R
79. See Manning, supra note 41, at 688 n.67. R
80. Nourse, supra note 42, at 73. R
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picking.”81 It does so by highlighting how widespread (or not) support
is for a particular view or counterview about statutory meaning. Inter-
preters should code all potentially relevant legislative materials and
input the codes into a format that can allow the interpreter to run
reports.
While there are a number of tools interpreters can use to input
and analyze the data, this Article’s analysis benefited from software
that is very useful in this area, but rarely considered by law-trained
interpreters. ATLAS.ti, a qualitative data analysis and research
software, can facilitate comprehensive and systematic reviews of leg-
islative history. The software allows interpreters to upload all legisla-
tive history materials onto the same database. As interpreters conduct
their review of all of the materials, they can highlight text that should
be included in the sample of statements relevant to adjudicating be-
tween the hypotheses and then assign codes to each statement indicat-
ing which view the statement supported. They can also evaluate the
relative weight the statement should be accorded depending on the
date of the bill and the level of the speaker’s involvement in the devel-
opment of the proposed bill. That is, they can code the speaker for
whether the speaker was the bill’s author, whether the speaker was on
the committee that considered the legislation, whether the speaker was
a “median legislator,” and other designations that may be relevant to
the interpreter’s analysis.
Another benefit of ATLAS.ti is that it permits interpreters to run
a variety of reports that can convert a qualitative review of the written
material into quantitative output. ATLAS.ti, for instance, can produce
a report of all statements that support one view or another. Such a
report enables the interpreter to review, in summary form, supportive
statements and to examine similarities between or nuances within
those statements. Because the system associates the numbers with spe-
cific quotes and codes, it is attuned to the nuances of content, which is
very necessary in law-and-policy analyses. At the same time, it has the
81. Roessler, supra note 5, at 108; see also Blackman, supra note 55, at 371–72 R
(claiming that judicial cherry-picking is exacerbated by there being no widely ac-
cepted approach to using legislative history); Edward Heath, How Federal Judges Use
Legislative History, 25 J. LEGIS. 95, 101 (1999) (“A willful judge, dissatisfied with
the outcome the statute patently produces, could plumb the legislative history in
search of excerpts of commentary to confirm an alternative reading which produces a
result he prefers.”); David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Su-
preme Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653,
1661–63 (2010) (“[G]iven the vast quantity and range of legislative history materials
from which to choose, it is all too tempting for a judge to take only what is conve-
nient—namely, that which helps to achieve the desired result—and to ignore the
rest.”) (footnote omitted).
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added value of simultaneously providing a more quantitative review of
the content. In other words, it gives interpreters numbers and frequen-
cies that can shed new light on the wider context surrounding disputes
over ambiguous statutory text.
This aspect of the forensic approach to legislative history can
help bring structure to the unstructured and heterogeneous world of
legislative history materials and can uncover hidden meanings in the
materials. It can also help identify whether a particular sentiment is
associated only with one person, a few people, or to a larger group of
legislators.82 Developing a comprehensive and systematic review of
the legislative history that takes into consideration all voices on a par-
ticular aspect of legislation will help to ameliorate cherry-picking con-
cerns as well as concerns that the legislative history has been peppered
with language on behalf of powerful interest groups. Similarly, be-
cause the coding will cover all views and counterviews that relate to a
specific question, it allows interpreters to look for and test alternative
interpretations of the same statutory text.83
III.
APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH
As a result of IRCA’s textual ambiguity about how it affects un-
authorized workers’ workplace protections, courts have divided on
this issue. The IRCA harmony courts conclude that providing unau-
thorized workers with the full panoply of subfederal workplace protec-
tions supports IRCA’s goal to reduce unauthorized immigration.84 By
contrast, the IRCA conflict courts identify a tension between federal
82. This responds to a common critique, for instance, that floor statements are sus-
ceptible to cherry-picking.  Since there are a number of statements, interpreters can
pluck out statements that support their view and ignore others.  Counting the number
of statements to weigh in favor of or against a particular interpretation can ameliorate
this problem. See Outzs, supra note 77, at 317 (“The lesser value placed upon floor R
statements may be due to the fact that they are particularly susceptible to a range of
criticisms made of all legislative history. The extensive pool of floor statements from
which assertions can be drawn as to a particular interpretation of a statute offers innu-
merable opportunities for misuse.”) (footnote omitted); Roether, supra note 72, at R
2768–69 (“[T]he Court is generally wary of relying on the opinion of a single legisla-
tor as an authoritative statement of congressional intent. Since statements uttered in
congressional debate often conflict, and only represent the view of a single, perhaps
uninformed, legislator on an isolated issue, relying on a floor statement poses a great
risk of producing an inaccurate indication of true congressional intent.”) (footnotes
omitted).
83. See NEUMAN, supra note 6, at 95–100. R
84. See cases cited supra note 33. R
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immigration law and some aspects of subfederal workplace
protections.85
A detailed review of these cases further specified that there are
essentially two types of underlying disagreements about IRCA that
can explain the differences in outcomes. These include opposing inter-
pretations regarding (1) the relative centrality of labor concerns in
IRCA and (2) the intended relationship between workplace protections
and the incentives of employers and immigrants. Along with framing
the opposing hypotheses and key variables, these two debates helped
identify the relevant sample of legislative history materials. The sub-
sections below describe the opposing hypotheses on each of the two
central debates, the universe of relevant legislative history documents
(the sample) and the findings.
A. Opposing Hypotheses on Centrality of Labor Concerns
The IRCA harmony and IRCA conflict courts disagree about the
role that labor concerns played in justifying the need for IRCA and, as
a result, have opposing views about whether to uphold or limit work-
place protections for unauthorized immigrants.86 The coding scheme
defined the “labor concerns” variable as including any stated concern
about wages, working conditions (including conditions deemed so un-
fair as to be considered exploitation), and/or employment opportuni-
ties. The two opposing hypotheses about the centrality of labor
concerns can be summarized as follows.
If the IRCA harmony courts have the more accurate interpreta-
tion of the statute, the legislative history analysis would support the
view that one of IRCA’s main purposes was to address labor con-
cerns.87 This is the case because the IRCA harmony cases acknowl-
edge, at least implicitly, that the provision of workplace protections—
such as protections related to the payment of wages and working con-
ditions—to unauthorized employees is consistent with IRCA’s main
85. See cases cited supra note 31. R
86. Compare infra note 87, with infra note 88. R
87. See, e.g., Asylum Co. v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 10 A.3d 619, 628 (D.C.
2010)  (“Interpreting the Act to exclude undocumented aliens, thereby permitting em-
ployers to avoid payments of benefits to such workers, could undermine the goal of
encouraging employers to foster a workplace that is safe for all workers.”); Abel
Verdon Const. v. Rivera, 348 S.W.3d 749, 755–56 (Ky. 2011) (failing to provide
subfederal protections “leav[es] the burden of caring for injured workers and their
dependents to the residents of the [state].”); Design Kitchen & Baths v. Lagos, 882
A.2d 817, 826 (Md. 2005) (“[W]ithout the protection of the statute, unscrupulous
employers could, and perhaps would, take advantage of this class of persons and en-
gage in unsafe practices with no fear of retribution, secure in the knowledge that
society would have to bear the cost of caring for these injured workers.”).
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purposes. If labor concerns were central, Congress could not have
meant to curtail workplace protections. By contrast, if the IRCA con-
flict courts represent the superior interpretation of the statute, we
would expect very few mentions of labor concerns as a justification
for IRCA. Instead, we would see other non-labor-related concerns in
statements about the bill’s purposes. If these courts had viewed labor
concerns as one of IRCA’s main purposes, they probably would not
have curtailed workplace protections of unauthorized workers in order
to avoid a conflict with IRCA.88
To determine the relative weight of labor concerns, the coding
team coded all justifications of the bill in the sample of the legislative
record for whether the justification cited labor concerns. This means
that the analysis includes any type of justification for the bill, even
those that did not relate to labor concerns in any way. The U.S. labor
and employment law scheme provides a rationale to code any discus-
sion of labor concerns in the legislative history of IRCA, regardless of
the immigration status of the workers mentioned. This is the case be-
cause the U.S. scheme acknowledges the interconnections between the
treatment of subclasses of workers (here, the unauthorized) and the
wages and working conditions of other classes of workers (here, the
authorized).
However, the prominence of labor concerns in IRCA’s legislative
history, alone, may not be entirely conclusive for some interpreters.
For them, it could simply mean that Congress’s purpose to address
labor problems related to concern for authorized workers and had
nothing to do with workplace law protections for unauthorized work-
ers. Alternatively, it could mean that legislators actively wanted to
make sure unauthorized workers did not have full access to workplace
protections. Thus, the coding team coded each justification of the bill
that mentioned a labor concern for whether it explicitly mentioned a
concern for unauthorized workers, authorized workers, or workers in
general (without a reference to their immigration status). It also coded
each justification of the bill that mentioned labor concerns for whether
the concerns for unauthorized workers were explicitly connected to
concerns for authorized workers.
This subcoding of all justifications of the bill that mentioned la-
bor concerns helps to further establish whether the IRCA harmony
courts have the more accurate view of IRCA’s purposes. If one of
88. See Catherine Fisk & Michael Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights Without Remedies for Undocumented Immi-
grants, in LABOR LAW STORIES 399, 400 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds.,
2005).
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IRCA’s main purposes was, in fact, to protect unauthorized workers in
particular, this would support the IRCA harmony courts’ interpretation
that IRCA intended to retain the workplace protections of unautho-
rized workers. If labor concerns did not relate to protection of unau-
thorized workers in a significant way, this would support the IRCA
conflict courts’ view that providing such protections to this group
would be in conflict with legislative purposes.
B. Opposing Hypotheses on the Relationship Between Workplace
Regulation and Incentives
The IRCA harmony courts and IRCA conflict courts also disa-
gree about legislative purposes with respect to how the workplace pro-
tections of unauthorized immigrants should affect the incentives of
unauthorized workers and/or employers. The coding scheme defined
the “workplace protections” variable as including references to any
legal protection at the federal or subfederal level that has to do with
wages, hours, employment discrimination, health and safety, or collec-
tive organizing at the workplace. The two opposing hypotheses about
the relationship between workplace protections and incentives can be
summarized as follows.
If IRCA conflict courts have the more accurate view of IRCA’s
purposes, we would expect any discussions of workplace protections
to relate more to immigrant incentives than to employer incentives.
That is, we would expect any discussion about the relationship be-
tween workplace protections and incentives to be more focused on the
quality of jobs immigrants might encounter. In other words, according
to this view, the availability of workplace protections may shape im-
migrant calculus to migrate without authorization. According to the
IRCA conflict cases, providing certain workplace protections to unau-
thorized workers would encourage future unauthorized immigration
and therefore would be in conflict with federal immigration policy
goals.89
In making this argument, either explicitly or implicitly, many of
these IRCA conflict courts assume that employers’ full compliance
with existing workplace standards is not a priority in the immigration
policy context. In other words, they assume that Congress’s purpose
was to prioritize disincentivizing potential immigrants from unautho-
89. See, e.g., Xinic v. Quick, No. 2004-226030, 2005 WL 3789231, at *1 (Va. Cir.
Ct. Nov. 14, 2005) (stating that the provision of subfederal workplace law remedy to
an unauthorized employee “not only trivializes the immigration laws, it also condones
and encourages future violations.”) (citing Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 150 (2002)).
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rized migration through a reduction in their workplace protections
over disincentivizing employers from preferring unauthorized immi-
grants through a requirement that they provide unauthorized workers
with full workplace protections.90
By contrast, if IRCA harmony courts have the superior view, we
would expect IRCA’s record to include more discussion about the re-
lationship between workplace protections and the incentives of em-
ployers to employ unauthorized immigrants. This is the case because
IRCA harmony courts surmise that workplace protections for unautho-
rized workers would ensure that they would not represent a cheaper,
more vulnerable source of labor that is attractive to employers.91
IRCA harmony courts anticipate that if employers are forced to re-
spect workplace protections for all workers, they will be less likely to
employ unauthorized workers and thereby reduce unauthorized immi-
gration. As one court put it, “[a]llowing employers to hire undocu-
90. See, e.g., Morejon v. Terry Hinge & Hardware, No. B162878, 2003 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 10394, at *30 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2003) (concluding, in a wrongful
termination case, that public policy “dictates [that undocumented employees] may not
recover for wrongful termination, notwithstanding any differences in knowledge be-
tween their respective employers regarding their work eligibility. The presentation of
fraudulent documents to an employer attacks IRCA’s verification system, regardless
of whether the employer is ignorant or knowledgeable of their falsity. If the employer
is ignorant, the employer is duped into submitting a misleading I-9 form; if not, the
unscrupulous employer is invited to violate IRCA with impunity because the docu-
ments support a defense that the employer acted in good faith.”); Sanchez v. Eagle
Alloy Inc., 658 N.W.2d 510, 512, 520–21 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that
employee’s IRCA violation required reduction of weekly wage-loss benefits remedy);
Xinic, 2005 WL 3789231, at *1 (stating that providing workers’ compensation reme-
dies to an undocumented employee may be in conflict with IRCA because it “not only
trivializes the immigration laws, it also condones and encourages future violations”)
(citing Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150); Crespo v. Evergo Corp., 841 A.2d 471, 477 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (concluding, in a pregnancy discrimination case, that
IRCA “precludes both economic and non-economic damages [that the plaintiff]
claims resulted from the termination of that employment” because of the “illegality of
plaintiff’s employment”).
91. See, e.g., Dowling v. Slotnick, 712 A.2d 396, 404 (Conn. 1998); Asylum Co.,
10 A.3d at 628; Cont’l PET Techs., Inc. v. Palacias, 604 S.E.2d 627, 630–31 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2004); Abel Verdon Constr., 348 S.W.3d at 755–56; Design Kitchen & Baths,
882 A.2d at 826; Correa v. Waymouth Farms, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 324, 328 (Minn.
2003); Amoah v. Mallah Mgmt., LLC, 866 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (App. Div. 2008);
Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 56, 66 (App. Div. 2005);
Farmers Bros. Coffee v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 23, 27–28
(Ct. App. 2005); Garcia v. Pasquareto, 812 N.Y.S.2d 216, 217 (App. Div. 2004) (“If
employers know that they will . . . be required to pay [unauthorized workers] at the
same rates as legal workers for work actually performed, there are virtually no incen-
tives left for an employer to hire an undocumented alien in the first instance.”);
Pineda v. Kel-Tech Const., Inc., 832 N.Y.S.2d 386, 392–93 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (“IRCA
and New York Labor Law Article 8 share the same goals”—namely removing “incen-
tives left for an employer to hire an undocumented alien in the first instance.”).
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mented workers and pay them less than the wage mandated by statute
is a strong incentive for the employers to do so, which in turn encour-
ages illegal immigration.”92 In line with the rationale of these cases,
IRCA harmony courts assume that one of Congress’s main concerns
with workplace protections had to do more with how to affect employ-
ers’ behavior rather than immigrants’ behavior.93
These courts are faced with what they sometimes perceive as an
either-or choice: to disincentivize employers (from preferring unautho-
rized immigrant workers over authorized workers by ensuring that un-
authorized workers have the same workplace protections as authorized
workers) or to disincentivize immigrants (from immigrating without
authorization by limiting their workplace protections in the United
States). Since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hoffman in 2002, liti-
gants have increasingly asked courts to make conclusions about Con-
gress’s purpose in this regard. A federal district court in California
captured the nature of this increasingly common “either-or” dilemma
well:
Every remedy extended to undocumented workers . . . provides a
marginal incentive for those workers to come to the United States. It is
just as true, however, that every remedy denied to undocumented
workers provides a marginal incentive for employers to hire those
workers. The economic incentives are in tension. Given this tension,
the courts must attempt to sensibly balance competing
considerations.94
Thus, the IRCA harmony and IRCA conflict courts differ in their
views of the relationship between workplace protections and the in-
centives of the parties—employers and immigrants—involved in un-
authorized immigrant employment. As a result, they disagree about
whether to uphold or limit workplace protections for unauthorized im-
migrants when faced with a question about IRCA’s effects on sub-
federal workplace protections. The coding scheme represents these
92. Reyes v. Van Elk, Ltd., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 68, 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
93. See, e.g., Dowling, 712 A.2d at 404 (“Potential eligibility for workers’ compen-
sation benefits in the event of a work-related injury realistically cannot be described
as an incentive for undocumented aliens to enter this country illegally.”); Asylum Co.,
10 A.3d at 633 (“[I]t [is] unlikely that the availability of workers’ compensation bene-
fits in the event of a debilitating work injury in the United States would significantly
affect an alien worker’s decision about whether to enter the country in response to the
already ‘magnetic’ force of the job market [that IRCA seeks to reduce].”); Amoah,
866 N.Y.S.2d at 800 (“[I]t is unlikely that denying wage-replacement benefits to in-
jured unauthorized workers will deter illegal aliens from violating IRCA in order to
obtain employment in the first place.”).
94. Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 1000 (N.H. 2005) (quoting
Singh v. Jutla, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2002)).
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opposing views by identifying all statements that dealt with the incen-
tives of either employers or immigrants in relationship to workplace
protections. This allows interpreters to evaluate the degree to which
statements that link workplace protections to incentives are directed
more towards immigrants or more towards employers.
C. The Sample
The coding team defined the sample of the legislative history as
including those aspects of the legislative history that are widely seen
as having higher authority: reports and debates.95 Since the two dis-
agreements about the statute relate to the underlying policies and pur-
poses of the legislation—rather than a specific word, or set of words,
within the statute—there was no need to deviate from this hierarchy.
Moreover, because there was no identifiable “textual decision” during
the legislative process, the coding team could not define the relevant
elements of the record by conducting a key word search. Rather, it
required a systematic review of the entire text included in the sample
of legislative history.
The coding team defined any element of the record as “relevant”
if it talked about a justification for the proposed legislation and/or
workplace-law related matters in any way. It reviewed all fifteen
IRCA reports, spanning from 1972 through 1986, and determined that
thirteen of these reports were relevant and should be coded. The cod-
ing team also reviewed every debate about IRCA between 1972 and
1986 and found that there were relevant debates in seven of those
years that should be coded. A review of the hearings and secondary
literature on IRCA’s legislative history did not yield a compelling rea-
son to code that voluminous body of documents.96
For the debates, the coding team coded each person for whether
any of the statements he or she made on a given day were relevant.
Given that the debates record a back and forth exchange, participants
in the debate often reiterated their points over the course of a day. If
every statement were coded individually, this could mean that particu-
larly vociferous debate participants would be accorded undue weight.
The coding team thus took a conservative approach to enumerating
statements made in favor of each hypothesis by only coding for
95. See supra notes 69–70. R
96. The coding team read or scanned every hearing. Our review of these documents
did not identify anything inconsistent with the trends we identified in the reports and
debates. Moreover, because there is no earlier textual decision that relates to the statu-
tory interpretation questions at issue here, there was no reason to hone in on particular
hearings relating to a textual decision.
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whether each person staked out a position regarding either of the key
variables, regardless of how many times they may have reiterated this
position on a particular day. Thus, the unit of analysis in the sample of
debates is that of positions staked out on any given day. Because there
is no relevant textual decision that was voted on during the legislative
process, and the relevant issues relate to underlying policies, there was
no reason to distinguish between legislators who voted for the legisla-
tion and legislators who voted against it.
D. The Findings on Centrality of Labor Concerns
The systematic review of IRCA’s legislative history supports the
IRCA harmony courts’ view that labor concerns were a main tenet of
IRCA’s purposes more than it supports the IRCA conflict courts’ op-
posing view. All thirteen of the relevant reports cite labor concerns as
a main purpose of the proposed legislation.97 Not surprisingly, the pri-
mary labor-related concern related to authorized workers. However,
all but one of the reports specifically referenced concern for the plight
of unauthorized workers as well.98 In fact, all but two of the thirteen
97. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 49 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 99-1000 (1986); S.
REP. No. 99-132, at 1 (1985); S. REP. No. 98-62, at 1 (1983); H.R. REP. No. 98-115,
pt. 1, at 30 (1983); S. REP. No. 97-485, at 1 (1982); H.R. REP. No. 97-890, pt. 1, at 29
(1982); STAFF OF S. & H.R. COMMITTEES ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY & NAT’L INTEREST NO. 8 (Joint Comm. Print 1981) (the
final report and recommendations of the Select Commission on Immigration and Ref-
ugee Policy with supplemental views by commissioners); STAFF OF SELECT COMMIS-
SION OF IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, 97TH CONG., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS (Joint Comm. Print 1981); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STAFF OF SELECT
COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., TEMPO-
RARY WORKER PROGRAMS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES (Comm. Print 1980); H.R. REP.
No. 96-1301, at 11, 23 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 94-506, at 2 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 93-
108, at 3 (1973).
98. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. & H.R. COMMITTEES ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG.,
1ST SESS., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY & NAT’L INTEREST NO. 8, at 42 (Joint Comm.
Print 1981) (“Undocumented/illegal migrants, at the mercy of unscrupulous employ-
ers and ‘coyotes’ who smuggle them across the border, cannot and will not avail
themselves of the protection of U.S. laws. . . . The presence of a substantial number of
undocumented/illegal aliens in the United States has resulted . . . in the breaking of
minimum wage and occupational safety laws.”); H.R. REP. No. 94-506, at 10 (1975)
(“[T]he instant legislation will go a long way in eliminating the exploitation of illegal
aliens and the other consequences that flow from their illegal status in the United
States.”); H.R. REP. No. 93-108, at 6 (1973) (“[E]mployers will continue to hire ille-
gal aliens since such persons by virtue of their precarious status must work harder,
longer, and often for less pay.”); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-1000, at 25 (1986); H.R.
REP. No. 99-682 pt. 1, at 49 (1986); S. REP. No. 99-132, at 16 (1985); H.R. REP. No.
98-115, pt. 1, at 17, 37 (1983); S. REP. No. 98-62, at 20 (1983); H.R. REP. No. 97-
890, pt. 1, at 193 (1982); S. REP. No. 97-485, at 19 (1982); STAFF OF SELECT COMMIS-
SION OF IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, 97TH CONG., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS, at 14 (Joint Comm. Print 1981); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STAFF OF SE-
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reports referred to the treatment of unauthorized immigrants in the
workplace as reprehensible “exploitation.”99 Senate Reports from
1982, 1983, and 1985 concluded that one of IRCA’s goals was to
“eliminate the illegal subclass now present in our society.”100 Accord-
ing to these reports, the “weak bargaining position” associated with
their unauthorized status “depress[es] U.S. wages and working condi-
tions” and fosters their role as “a fearful and clearly exploitable
group.”101
Legislators more often than not linked the treatment of unautho-
rized workers with their concern for authorized workers. Nine of the
thirteen reports made this explicit connection.102 While the addenda to
LECT COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., TEM-
PORARY WORKER PROGRAMS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES, at 104 (Comm. Print 1980).
99. See H.R. REP. No. 98-115, pt. 1, at 37 (1983) (noting “the exploitation of this
vulnerable population in the workplace”); H.R. REP. No. 97-890, pt. 1, at 193 (1982)
(“An unscrupulous employer can exploit this vulnerability by threatening the alien
with exposure to INS if s/he does not agree to the employer’s conditions of employ-
ment. We strongly object to this situation, for it revives the specter of forced slavery
and pardons the employer for illegal conduct.”); STAFF OF S. & H.R. COMMITTEES ON
THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY & NAT’L INTER-
EST NO. 8, at 13 (Joint Comm. Print 1981) (referring to this group as “exploitable at
the workplace” such that they are “depressing U.S. labor standards and wages”);
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STAFF OF SELECT COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE
POLICY, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAMS: BACKGROUND AND
ISSUES at 109 (Comm. Print 1980) (“Recent reports of wide scale exploitation of ille-
gal migrants in the garment industry in New York and Los Angeles indicate, in addi-
tion to the exploitation of the workers themselves, that an undermining of U.S. labor
standards may be a direct result of the workers’ vulnerability because of their illegal
status.”); H.R. REP. No. 94-506, at 7 (1975) (“[I]llegal aliens: take jobs which could
be filled by American workers; depress the wages and impair the working conditions
of American workers; reduce the effectiveness of employee organizations; compete
most directly with unskilled and uneducated American citizens and constitute for em-
ployers a group highly susceptible to exploitation.”); H.R. REP. No. 93-108, at 8
(1973) (“[I]f an employee is known to be an illegal alien, he may then be subject to
exploitation by an unscrupulous employer. Many such employers deny illegal aliens
vacation and overtime pay. In addition, as a result of their illegal status, such aliens
are often threatened with exposure by their employer if they complain about substan-
dard wages and working conditions.”); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 49 (1986);
H.R. REP. No. 99-1000, at 25 (1986); S. REP. No. 99-132, at 16 (1985); S. REP. No.
98-62, at 20 (1983); S. REP. No. 97-485, at 19 (1982).
100. S. REP. No. 99-132, at 16 (1985); S. REP. No. 98-62, at 20 (1983); S. REP. No.
97-485, at 19 (1982).
101. S. REP. No. 99-132, at 16 (1985); S. REP. No. 98-62, at 20 (1983); S. REP. No.
97-485, at 19 (1982).
102. S. REP. No. 99-132, at 108 (1985) (“The chairman has already spoken on many
occasions about the exploitable underclass of undocumented aliens in this country
today. It is evident that these are people who are productive members of society but
who are unable, for example, to seek redress for crimes, who are fearful of reporting
job-related abuse and who have virtually nowhere to turn. They are forced to live a
semiclandestine life.”) (minority view); H.R. REP. No. 98-115, pt. 1, at 167 (1983)
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the reports (dissent, minority, additional, concurrence, supplemental)
have less authority than the majority views represented in the main
body of the report, they provide more support for IRCA harmony
courts than for IRCA conflict courts.103 Eight of eight addenda noted
labor concerns as a main purpose of the proposed legislation.104 Six of
(stating that we should not overlook “the existence of a large underclass of illegal
aliens”); S. REP. No. 98-62, at 127 (1983) (“A large undocumented population con-
tributes to the creation and perpetuation of an exploited subclass [of] society afraid to
report crimes and illnesses which endanger the public health”) (additional view); H.R.
REP. No. 97-890, pt. 1, at 193 (1982) (“The cost to society of perpetuating an under-
class of exploited citizens in [sic] incalculable. It is therefore in the best interests of
this country to bring this large underclass of persons into the mainstream of our soci-
ety and under the protection of our laws.”); S. REP. No. 97-485, at 5 (1982) (“[O]nly a
small fraction of [immigrants] are individually selected on the basis of labor market
skills which have been determined to benefit the nation as a whole . . . . [As a result,]
there have been generally adverse job impacts, especially on low income, low-skilled
Americans, who are the most likely to face direct competition.”); STAFF OF S. & H.R.
COMMITTEES ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
& NATIONAL INTEREST NO. 8, at 400  (Joint Comm. Print 1981) (“The effect of the
Commission’s proposals will be to drive the undocumented, particularly the Mexican
undocumented immigrant, further Underground.”); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STAFF OF
SELECT COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAMS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES, at 5 (Comm. Print
1980) (“Undocumented aliens are part of the underground economy, operating outside
the control and protection of the law.”); H.R. REP. No. 94-506, at 10 (1975) (“The
illegal alien fearing detection and deportation is often subjected to intimidation, har-
assment, extortion, and blackmail by unscrupulous employers. In addition, such an
employee by virtue of his status is in no position to report an employer who pays
substandard wages, denies rightful benefits, and maintain [sic] poor working condi-
tions”); H.R. REP. No. 93-108, at 7 (1973) (“In light of this adverse impact of illegal
alien workers on American citizens and permanent residents, we recognized the need
for better sanctions to curb the problem”).
103. There were eight addenda attached to the thirteen reports (dissent, minority,
additional, concurrence, supplemental). Eight of eight addenda cited labor concerns as
a main purpose of the bill. Six of these eight addenda mentioned concern for unautho-
rized workers in particular. Four addenda linked the treatment of unauthorized work-
ers and authorized workers.
104. H.R. REP.  NO. 99-682, at 47–48 (1986) (minority); S. REP. NO. 99-132 (1985),
at 104–05 (minority); S. REP. NO. 99-132 (1985), at 108 (minority); S. REP. NO. 98-
62, at 127–28 (1983) (additional); S. REP. NO. 98-62, at 129 (1983) (minority); S.
REP. NO. 98-62, at 134 (1983) (minority); H.R. REP. NO. 98-115, pt. 1, at 168 (1983)
(additional); H.R. REP. NO. 98-115 Part 1, at 169 (1983) (additional); H.R. REP. NO.
98-115 Part 1, at 180 (1983) (dissent); H.R. REP. NO. 98-115 Part 4, at 70 (1983)
(minority); H.R. REP. NO. 98-115 Part 4, at 74 (1983) (additional); S. REP. NO. 97-
485, at 105 (1982) (additional); S. REP. NO. 97-485, at 112 (1982) (additional); S.
REP. NO. 97-485, at 117 (1982) (additional); S. REP. NO. 97-485, at 119 (1982) (mi-
nority); H.R. REP. NO. 97-890 Part 1, at 191 (1982) (dissent); H.R. REP. NO. 97-890
Part 1, at 194 (1982) (dissent); H.R. REP. NO. 97-890 Part 1, at 215 (1982) (dissent);
H.R. REP. NO. 97-890 Part 2, at 48 (1982) (minority); H.R. REP. NO. 94-506, at 31
(1975) (additional); H.R. REP. NO. 94-506, at 33 (1975) (supplemental); H.R. REP.
NO. 94-506, at 37 (1975) (dissent); H.R. REP. NO. 93-108, at 25 (1973) (additional).
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eight addenda specifically referenced unauthorized workers.105 A mi-
nority opinion from the 1985 Senate Report, for instance, stated the
following:
[I]t is wrong that the sanctions under current law fall solely on
the undocumented aliens, not on employers who may be exploiting
them. The Government needs stronger enforcement tools to deal with
the serious problem of employers who engage in a pattern and practice
of hiring and exploiting undocumented aliens.106
The coding of the debates similarly supports the IRCA harmony
courts’ view more than the IRCA conflict courts’ view. As elaborated
above, the unit of analysis is whether any legislator on a given day
made a relevant statement (or position taken on any given day of de-
bate). Table 1 presents the results of this analysis disaggregated by
year of the debate. The final column of the table reveals that overall,
ninety percent of legislator positions on any given day of debate re-
garding the main purposes of the bill mentioned labor concerns as
central. In 1986, the year that the legislation was passed, the percent-
age of positions citing labor concerns as central was lower than in any
other year. Nonetheless, it is still quite high at sixty-six percent. This
table considers the total number of relevant legislator positions. If we
isolated the positions of bill sponsors and bill introducers, we would
see a similar trend. All of their positions, in all of the coded years, cite
labor concerns as a main justification for the bill.107
105. S. REP. NO. 99-132, at 107–08 (1985) (minority); S. REP. NO. 98-62, at 127–28
(1983) (additional); S. REP. NO. 98-62, at 129 (1983) (minority); S. REP. NO. 98-62, at
134 (1983) (minority); H.R. REP. NO. 98-115, pt. 1, at 168 (1983) (additional); H.R.
REP. NO. 97-890, pt. 1, at 192 (1982) (dissent); H.R. REP. NO. 97-890, pt. 1, at
194–95 (1982) (dissent); S. REP. NO. 97-485, at 112–13 (1982) (additional); S. REP.
NO. 97-485, at 117 (1982) (additional); S. REP. NO. 97-485, at 119 (1982) (minority);
H.R. REP. NO. 94-506, at 37 (1975) (dissent).
106. S. REP. No. 99-132, at 104 (1985) (minority); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-506, at
41 (1975) (“[E]mployers can take unfair advantage of [unauthorized] persons with
impunity.”) (dissent).
107. 132 CONG. REC. 25,752, 30,038, 30,157, 30,181, 30,904, 31,572, 31,639–41,
32,248, 33,208, 33,213, 33,226 (1986); 131 CONG. REC. 23,317, 23,534, 23,719,
23,815, 23,841–42, 23,815, 23,967–69, 23,972–73, 24,267–68, 24,401 (1985); 129
CONG. REC. 12,369–70, 12,575–76, 12,808, 12,811, 12,821, 12,836 (1983); 128
CONG. REC. 20,829, 20,862, 21,665, 31,785–86, 31,797, 32,013–14 (1982); 119
CONG. REC. 14,181, 14,185 (1973); 118 CONG. REC. 30,154, 30,158 (1972).
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TABLE 1: THE RELATIVE CENTRALITY OF LABOR CONCERNS IN
DEBATE POSITIONS ABOUT BILL’S PURPOSES
Year 1972 1973 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Overall
% that mention
labor concerns as 86 100 86 100 100 94 66 90
central
% that do not
mention labor 14 0 14 0 0 6 34 10
concerns as central
Number of positions 21 11 57 25 93 35 93 335per debate day
This evidence that labor concerns were indeed a central tenet of
the legislation supports the IRCA harmony courts’ interpretation and
undermines the IRCA conflict courts’ view that Congress’s purpose
was to reduce the workplace law protections of unauthorized immi-
grants. This becomes even clearer if we look at the debates coding
related to statements about concern for unauthorized workers’ work-
ing conditions. Table 2 represents the findings produced by the sub-
coding of all positions staked out that included viewing labor concerns
as central to justifying the bill. It demonstrates that a significant pro-
portion of legislator positions included concerns for unauthorized
workers. In 1972, fifty-five percent of positions taken on any given
day of debate included an explicit concern for unauthorized immi-
grants. In 1986, this percentage was even higher. That year, seventy-
two percent of the positions echoed this sentiment. Similar to the trend
above, each position of bill sponsors and bill introducers included la-
bor concerns about unauthorized workers in particular as a main justi-
fication for the bill.108
108. 132 CONG. REC. 25,752, 30,038, 30,157, 30,181, 31,632, 32,248, 33,230
(1986); 131 CONG. REC. 23,317, 23,534, 23,719, 23,814–15, 24,267–68, 24,401
(1985); 129 CONG. REC. 12,369–70, 12,575–76, 12,808, 12,811, 12,821, 12,836
(1983); 128 CONG. REC. 20,829, 20,862, 21,665, 31,785–86, 31,797, 32,013–14
(1982); 119 CONG. REC. 14,185 (1973); 118 CONG. REC. 30,154 (1972).
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TABLE 2: THE RELATIVE CONCERN FOR UNAUTHORIZED WORKERS IN
DEBATE POSITIONS ABOUT LABOR CONCERNS
Year 1972 1973 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Overall
% that mention
concern for 55 83 86 75 100 78 72 78
unauthorized
workers
% that do not
mention concern for 45 17 14 25 0 22 28 22
unauthorized
workers
Number of positions 11 18 29 8 45 32 61 204per debate day
Finally, coding the debates further confirms that a significant
proportion of legislators made an explicit connection between the
treatment of unauthorized and authorized workers. About fifty percent
of the relevant statements in 1985109 and 1986110 made this explicit
connection. In 1972, twenty-four percent made this connection and in
1973, thirty-six percent made this connection. In sum, the findings
provide overwhelming support for the IRCA harmony courts’ ratio-
nale that labor concerns in general, and labor concerns about unautho-
rized workers in particular, were a central justification for the
legislation.
E. The Findings on the Relationship Between Workplace
Protections and Incentives
The systematic review of IRCA’s legislative history supports the
IRCA harmony courts’ view that full workplace protections for unau-
thorized workers would disincentivize employers from hiring unautho-
rized employees more than the IRCA conflict courts’ opposing view.
When workplace protections were mentioned, they were most often
mentioned in connection with reducing employer incentives to prefer
unauthorized immigrant employees over authorized employees. Eight
of the thirteen reports considered the relationship between incentives
and workplace protections for unauthorized workers. All eight con-
firmed the IRCA harmony courts’ theory that workplace protections
for unauthorized immigrants dissuade employers from hiring this
109. Sixteen out of thirty-two relevant statements made this explicit connection.
110. Twenty-seven out of sixty-one relevant statements made this explicit
connection.
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workforce.111 No report confirmed the IRCA conflict courts’ view that
providing the full panoply of workplace protections to unauthorized
workers would increase incentives for immigrants to violate immigra-
tion laws.
The final conference report on the legislation in 1986, which
many would argue carries with it the most authoritative weight, illus-
trates support for the IRCA harmony courts’ rationale. Announcing
additional funding for the Department of Labor, the report expressed
that the goal of heightened wage and hour enforcement on behalf of
unauthorized workers was to “deter the employment of unauthorized
aliens and remove the economic incentive for employers to exploit
and use such aliens.”112 A 1986 House Report, which is often cited in
post-Hoffman cases, is the most explicit statement on Congressional
intent in this area. It states:
[T]he committee does not intend that any provision of this Act
would limit the powers of State or Federal labor standards agencies
such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the
Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, or Labor arbitrators, in conformity with existing law,
to remedy unfair practices committed against undocumented em-
ployees for exercising their rights before such agencies or for en-
gaging in activities protected by these agencies. To do otherwise
would be counter-productive of our intent to limit the hiring of un-
documented employees and the depressing effect on working con-
ditions caused by their employment.113
While the Hoffman Court found this one report from one house
of Congress to be a “slender reed” of legislative intent, it carries more
persuasive weight when we see it in the context of a long line of re-
ports that echo this sentiment. The 1983 House Report, for instance,
included the same exact statement.114 Similarly, the 1982 Senate Re-
port proposed “increased enforcement of wage and working standards
legislation” on behalf of unauthorized immigrants as the kind of “im-
111. H.R. REP. No. 99-1000, at 25 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 106 (1986);
H.R. REP. No. 98-115, at 37 (1983); S. REP. No. 98-62, at 22, 120 (1983); H.R. REP.
No. 97-890, at 195 (1982); S. REP. No. 97-485, at 120 (1982); STAFF OF S. & H.R.
COMMITTEES ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
& NAT’L INTEREST NO. 8, at 344 (Joint Comm. Print 1981); CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
STAFF OF SELECT COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, 96TH CONG., 2D
SESS., TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAMS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES, at 134 (Comm.
Print 1980).
112. H.R. REP. No. 99-1000, at 25 (1986).
113. H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 2, at 8–9 (1986).
114. H.R. REP. No. 98-115, pt. 4, at 17 (1983).
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mediate action” that was necessary to curb unauthorized
immigration.115
A 1981 report similarly made the explicit connection between
providing workplace protections for unauthorized workers and em-
ployer incentives. It stated that heightened enforcement of federal oc-
cupational safety and health, wage and hour, social security,
unemployment insurance, and employment discrimination protections
on behalf of unauthorized immigrants “will reduce the incentive for
employers to hire undocumented workers.”116 Only three of the ad-
denda of the debates referenced the relationship between workplace
protections and incentives to discriminate against undocumented
workers.117 All three, however, supported the IRCA harmony view.
It appears that this issue was not specifically debated even though
it was consistently covered in House, Senate, and conference reports.
The coding of the debates yielded only two relevant statements about
the relationship between incentives and workplace protections for un-
authorized workers. These two statements, both from 1985, provide
modest additional support for the IRCA harmony courts’ view. They
simply report on the proposal, which ultimately became law, to pro-
vide more funding to the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour divi-
sion. One of these statements, made by a bill sponsor, echoed the 1986
conference report statement that the reason for enhanced wage and
hour law enforcement was to “deter the employment of unauthorized
aliens and remove the economic incentive for employers to exploit
and use such aliens.”118
CONCLUSION
The Article commenced with the question of whether federal im-
migration law affects the subfederal workplace protections available
to unauthorized workers. To date, court battles and scholarship on this
issue have led to a virtual stalemate and often focus exclusively on
normative policy arguments. While this study certainly acknowledges
that there are drawbacks and limitations to the use of legislative his-
tory, it draws from methods typically employed by social scientists to
add rigor to legal analyses of legislative history. The application of a
115. S. REP. No. 97-485, at 23–24 (1982).
116. STAFF OF S. & H.R. COMMITTEES ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY & NAT’L INTEREST NO. 8, at 357 (Joint Comm. Print
1981).
117. S. REP. No. 98-62, at 133 (1983) (minority); S. REP. No. 97-485, at 119 (1982)
(minority); H.R. REP. No. 97-890, pt. 1, at 194 (1982) (dissent).
118. 131 CONG. REC. 23,318 (1985); 131 CONG. REC. 23,300 (1985).
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forensic approach to fifteen years of IRCA’s legislative history pro-
vides a fresh, and more empirically rigorous, perspective on the rela-
tionship between immigration policy and subfederal workplace
protections relating to unauthorized workers.
Specifically, the analysis shows that reducing unauthorized work-
ers’ subfederal workplace protections was not one of the purposes of
the legislation. If anything, IRCA’s legislative history demonstrates a
congressional purpose to uphold unauthorized workers’ workplace
protections as a means to deter employers from seeking out unautho-
rized workers. To do otherwise would simultaneously work against
both the immigration and workplace law regulatory regimes and
would unconstitutionally step on the historic powers of subfederal
governments to protect the working conditions of workers that labor
within their territories. By developing a forensic framework for the
study of legislative history, the Article also implores scholars and
courts to focus less on bashing legislative history. It instead encour-
ages them to develop empirical responses to these common critiques
that can revive legislative history as a more reliable interpretive tool in
law and policy analyses.
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